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Data show that better creditor protection is correlated across countries with lower average 
stock market volatility. Moreover, countries with better creditor protection seem to have 
suffered lower decline in their stock market indexes during the current financial crisis. To 
explain this regularity, we use a Tobin q model of investment and show that stronger creditor 
protection increases the expected level and lowers the variance of stock prices in the presence 
of credit crunches. There are two main channels through which creditor protection enhances 
the performance of the stock market: (1) The credit-constrained stock price increases with 
better protection of creditors; (2) The probability of a credit crunch leading to a binding credit 
constraint falls with strong protection of creditors. We find strong empirical support for both 
predictions using data on stock market performance, amount and cost of credit, and creditor 
rights protection for 52 countries over the period 1980-2007. In particular, we find that crises 
are more frequent in countries with poor creditor protection. Using propensity score matching 
we also show that during crises stock market returns fall by more in countries with poor 
creditor protection. 
JEL-Code: E440. 








Tel-Aviv University & Cornell University 
razin@post.tau.ac.il 
Hui Tong 
International Monetary Fund 
htong@imf.org 
 
April 15, 2011 
We thank Chris Candelaria for competent research assistance. We thank Bjorn Brugemann, 
Yin-Wong Cheung, David Cook, Michael Dooley, Ray Fair, Hans Genberg, Charles 
Goodhart, Paul De Grauwe, Michael Hutchison, Guiseppe Moscarini, Roberto De Santis, and 
seminar participants at the LSE, HKIMR, and UC Santa Cruz for helpful comments. Anita 
Todd helped prepare the draft. Razin thanks the Bank of England for hospitality during the 
early work on this project. This paper represents the views of the authors and should not be 
thought to represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Federal Reserve 
System, or the International Monetary Fund. 1 Introduction
A central problem in the credit market is that lenders are reluctant to make loans because they
cannot easily determine whether a prospective borrower has resources to repay the loan. If the
loan is made, the lender is concerned whether the borrower will engage in risky behavior that could
lower the probability that the loan will be repaid. Collateral reduces this information asymmetry
problem because good collateral (that is, assets that are easily valued and easy to take control of)
signicantly decreases the losses to the lender if the borrower defaults on the loan. Good collateral
also reduces the moral hazard problem because the borrower is reluctant to engage in excessively
risky behavior since now he or she has something to lose. Creditor protection enhances the ability of
the lender to take control of the collateral in case of default and thereby alleviate credit constraints.
Thus, creditor rights regulation helps mitigate the problems of information asymmetry and moral
hazard between creditors and borrowers. This mechanism is the focus of our paper.
Our analysis is motivated by two cross-country empirical regularities: rst, that better creditor
protection is associated with lower stock price volatility, and second, that countries with better
creditor protection suered lower declines in their stock market indexes during current nancial
crisis.
Recent literature on law and nance has emphasized the role of strong institutions, such as those
that enhance creditor protection, in fostering the development of nancial markets. Accordingly,
creditor rights' protection aects the credit cycle, and credit market breadth. For example, La
Porta et al. (1997) nd that countries with poor creditor protection have smaller debt markets.
Their ndings are conrmed by Levine (2004) as well as Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006),
with broader country coverage. Burger and Warnock (2006) also nd that countries with stronger
creditor rights have more developed local bond markets, and their economies rely less on foreign{
currency bonds. Furthermore, Galindo and Micco (2005) nd that strong creditor rights can reduce
the volatility of the credit market. Creditor protection also lowers a rm's borrowing costs and
2increases the rm's value (e.g., La Porta et al. (2000) and Bae and Goyal (2003)); and it also reduces
cash{ow risk, operating income variability, and operating leverage (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, and
Nenova (2001)). This literature focuses mainly on the credit market itself, but not on the eect of
creditor protection on the stock market.
In this paper, we attempt to ll a gap in the literature by addressing the issue of how the
protection of creditor rights aect the level and volatility of stock prices.1 We develop a Tobin q
model of stock prices, and show the mechanism through which creditor protection may aect the
level and the volatility of stock prices.
In the empirical part of the paper, we analyze data of the aggregate stock prices in 52 countries
over the years 1980-2008. Liquidity crises are measured as a big decline in bank credit to the
private sector or a large rise in the real interest rate. We nd that better creditor protection
reduces the frequency of the liquidity crises, as our model predicts, especially in the sample of
developing countries. We conrm this nding by estimating a probit regression controlling for a
set of variables that also aect crisis probability.
Next we examine whether the liquidity crisis indicator has an eect on the stock market prices.
We nd that negative excess returns during crises are much larger in countries with poor creditor
rights protection, especially in developing countries. By conditioning on the crisis probability using
the propensity score matching we nd that in a matched sample stock returns are lower during
crises for countries with poor creditor rights protection but not for countries with good creditor
rights protection. Thus, we nd strong empirical support for the mechanism developed in our
model.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of an empirical
regularity. Section 3 develops the benchmark model of investment and stock prices in friction{free
1Some studies have examined how corporate control aects the dispersion of stock prices within a market. For
example, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) look at the stock price co-movement within a country. They nd that co-
movement is more pronounced in poor economies than in rich economies, which they contribute to cross-country
dierences in property rights. Our work is not concerned with the idiosyncratic dispersion of stock prices, but rather
with the instability in the aggregate.
3and in credit{constrained regimes. Section 4 analyzes the model in the presence of liquidity shocks
and presents the main ndings of the analysis. Section 5 demonstrates that these ndings are
consistent with the data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Regularity
In this section we present an empirical regularity which serves to motivate the analysis in the
following sections.
As a proxy for creditor protection we use the creditor rights index (CRI) compiled by Djankov
et al. (2007). This is a panel that covers 129 countries for 1978-2007. The creditor rights index
is constructed in the same was as in La Porta, et al. (1998). It ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher
number associated with better protection for creditors. The index is formed by adding one for
each of the following four institutions: when the country imposes restrictions, such as requiring a
rm to obtain creditor consent or pay minimum dividends to le for reorganization; when secured
creditors are able to gain possession of their security as soon as the reorganization petition has been
approved (with no automatic stay); when secured creditors are ranked rst in the distribution of
the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt rm; and when the debtor
does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.
Appendix Table 1 shows 49 countries in our sample that fall into dierent categories of the creditor
rights index in 2007.
Our rst piece of motivating evidence comes from the current nancial crisis. As Table 1 shows,
with the exception of the four countries with credit rights index of 0, countries with better creditor
protection experienced on average a lower decline in their stock price index in 2008. In particular,
high levels of creditor protection, 3 or 4, are associated with lower decline in the stock market
during the current crisis.
Looking further back in history, we can see that better creditor protection is associated with
4Table 1: Average change in the stock market index during the crisis
during 2008 during 2008-09
CRI Mean Median Mean Median N. countries
0 -38.9 -36.0 -6.4 -5.2 4
1 -48.5 -50.4 -33.8 - 26.1 14
2 -52.3 -51.5 -29.1 -34.0 11
3 -44.3 -47.3 -18.0 - 24.1 11
4 -39.0 -37.4 -15.2 -15.8 6
Note: change in the stock market index
from close on the last trading day in 2007
to the close on the last trading day in 2008 or 2009.
lower stock index volatility. Table 2 presents such evidence for the full sample as well as for the
subsamples of OECD and non{OECD countries. We combine levels of creditor rights index of 0, 1
and 2 into an indicator of low level of creditor rights protection and level of creditor rights index
of 3 and 4 into an indicator of high level of creditor rights protection. We then test for statistical
signicance of the dierence in stock market volatility depending on the level of creditor protection.
To measure stock price volatility, we use stock market indexes from Global Financial Data.
We use monthly data calculated by central banks, national statistical agencies, or stock exchanges
themselves as of the end{of{month closes. We scale down all stock market indexes by the local CPI
at the end of the month. To measure the stock return volatility (), we compute non{overlapping
standard deviations for the monthly stock returns for each calendar year.
Top panel of Table 2 is based on the panel evidence for our 49 countries for years 1980-2007.2
It shows strong evidence that in countries and years with high index of creditor rights stock market
volatility is lower than in countries and years with low index of creditor rights. One possible concern
with this evidence is that creditor rights index, while available for a panel of countries, does not
2We exclude 2008 in order not to capture the eect of the current crisis.
5Table 2: Stock market volatility and creditor protection
Full sample Non-OECD OECD
Volatility of monthly stock returns
Mean Low CRI 8.149 10.15 6.627
(N.obs) (793) (343) (450)
Mean High CRI 6.705 7.588 5.869
(N.obs) (471) (229) (242)
Dierence -1.445*** -2.558*** -0.758***
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Volatility of annual stock returns
Mean Low CRI 39.52 50.05 32.09
(N.obs) (29) (12) (17)
Mean High CRI 29.81 33.14 26.81
(N.obs) (19) (9) (10)
Dierence -9.719*** -16.92*** -5.286
(P-value) (0.004) (0.0006) (0.147)
***signicant at 1%
change much over time, thus exaggerating signicance levels of the t-tests. Thus, the second panel
of Table 2 presents cross{country evidence with stock market volatility measure based on annual
observations over the sample period between 1980 and 2007, or as long as the data are available.
Here we dene an indicator of high level of creditor protection as average CRI for a given country
being higher than 2.5. We classify countries that joined OECD half{way through our sample period
as non-OECD. We still nd that stock market volatility is substantially higher in countries with
low level of creditor protection, although for the OECD subsample the signicance level of the
dierence is only 14.7%, not surprising, given small sample size.
Thus, we nd that stock market volatility, historically, is higher in the countries with lower
level of creditor protection. Moreover, we nd that countries with higher creditor protection level
suered lower declines in their stock market indexes during current nancial crisis. We now turn
6to the model that provides an explanation for this empirical regularity.
3 A Tobin q Model of Stock Prices
This section derives the analytical expression for the stock price by using the standard Tobin q
model. We consider two regimes: a frictionless credit regime, and a credit constrained regime.
3.1 The Friction-Free Regime
Consider a small open economy facing a xed world interest rate r. The production function of a




where At, 1 , and Kt denote respectively the productivity shock parameter, the distributive share
of capital, and the stock of capital. The productivity shock follows a rst-order auto-regressive
stochastic process:
ln(At+1) =  ln(At) + "t+1; (2)
where "t+1 has a uniform distribution over [ 1;1].












where It = Kt+1   Kt denotes net capital formation and 1
v is the cost-of-adjustment coecient
(depreciation rate is assumed to be equal to zero). As usual, gross investment exceeds net capi-
tal formation because of some additional reorganization and retraining costs associated with the
installation of new capital.
3For a similar model of stock prices, see Krugman (1998) and Frenkel and Razin (1996, Chapter 7).
7Producers maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of prots subject to the avail-












t+s   Zt+s + Qt+s (Kt+s + It+s   Kt+s+1)

: (4)
The Lagrangian multiplier, Qt, is interpreted as the marginal Tobin Q.


























where Rt+1 denotes period t + 1 capital rental rate.
Competitive factor markets imply that
Rt+1 = (1   )At+1K
 
t+1: (7)
The investment rule in equation (6) states that the cost of investing an additional unit of
capital in the current period must equal to the expected present value of the next period marginal
productivity of capital, plus the next period decline in adjustment costs (resulting from the next
period enlargement of the stock of capital due to present period investment), plus the continuation
marginal value of units of capital which will remain in the future.





8With a quadratic cost-of-adjustment function, the stock price, Pt, is equal to the marginal Tobin
q, Qt. That is, Pt = Qt.4
The deterministic steady state is given by





; and  Q =  P = 1: (9)
Log-linearizing the set of equations (5) and (7) around the deterministic steady state yields an
approximated expression for Qt, as follows5.
Pt = Qt =
(1   )
 
1 + ln  K + at + (v   kt)
  K + Et [Qt+1]
 
1 + r + v(1   )  K
 ; (10)
where at = ln(At) and kt = ln(Kt).
The equilibrium level of Pt is a linear combination of the state variables, at and kt, as follows:
Pt = B0 + B1at + B2kt: (11)
Substituting equations (11) into equation (10), we solve for B0, B1, and B2 by comparing coecients
for at and kt:
B0 =











Based on equations (5) and (12), the non credit-constrained equilibrium investment level is given
by:
It0 = vKt (B0 + B1at + B2kt   1): (13)
4See Hayashi (1982) for the equality between average Q (the price) and the marginal Q.
5See Appendix 1.
9Equation (13) implies that the non-credit-constrained investment increases if productivity rises
(that is, B1 > 0) ; and that the investment falls if the stock of capital increases (that is, B2 > 0),
as expected.
3.2 The Credit-Constrained Regime
We assume that the collateral required by the creditors in the credit market is a fraction, !, of the
existing capital stock, Kt, minus liquidation expenses induced by the liquidity shock, Wt.6That is,
the credit constraint is given by:
It  !Kt   Wt; (14)
The fraction ! is the creditor protection parameter (that is, better credit protection is associated
with a larger !).7 The collateral insures the lender from any default on the rm's debt.
For simplicity, we assume that the aggregate liquidity shock, Wt, is permanent. We also assume
that after the realization of Wt, no future shocks are anticipated. That is, upon the realization in
period t of the liquidity shock, Wt, the investment constraint is a binding constraint in all present
and future periods: t;t + 1;:::;1. Thus, we assume that
Is = !Ks   Ws for all s  t. (15)
6See the related literature of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Hart and Moore (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
and Mendoza (2006a,b).
7In the literature on credit constraint and nancial accelerator, the constraint tends to be based on a rm's
market value !qtKt. However, if both qt and Kt are endogenous as in Mendoza (2006b), then no tractable solution
is available for qt. By using !Kt rather than !qtKt, we are able to provide tractable closed-form solutions for qt and
its volatility.
103.2.1 Derivation of the credit-constrained stock price
The maximum value of the rm at the end of period t, Lt, is given by:


































Because the credit constraint is binding, we also have
Kt+s+1 = (1 + !)Kt+s   Wt; for all s = 0;1;2;::: (18)














































We can now solve for the stock price ^ Pt; by \guessing" the linear equilibrium relationship
8To simplify the exposition, we assume that the realized value of Wt (which triggers the credit constraint to be
binding) is equal to zero.
11between ^ Pt and the state variables, at and kt:
^ Pt = C0 + C1at + C2kt: (21)
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4 Eects of the Liquidity Crises and Creditor Protection
We can now use the above results to derive the relationship between creditor protection and stock
price level and volatility in the presence of credit constraints and liquidity crises.
4.1 The Eect of Liquidity Crises on the Stock Price
We are now in a position to derive the expression for the expected returns in the stock market as
a function of the probability of the credit crunch. Let Ut be a dummy indicator for the credit-
constrained binding regime. That is, Ut = 1 when the credit constraint binds and Ut = 0 when the
credit constraint does not bind. The expected value of the stock price is:
E [Pt;at;kt;!] = Pr(Ut = 0)Pt;unconstrained + Pr(Ut = 1) Pt;constrained (23)
The probability of a credit crunch, Pr(Ut = 1), is given by











(1   Pr(Ut = 0)): (25)
We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 1: If the creditor protection becomes stronger, the expected stock price rises
through two channels: (1) The probability of credit crunches diminishes; (2) The market value of
the rm rises in the credit-constrained regime.
The proposition is proved by noting that:
i)
@ Pr(Ut = 0)
@!
> 0;
because the expression Pr(It0 > !Kt   Wt) depends negatively on !.




iii) In general, the value function in the constrained regime cannot exceed the value function in
the unconstrained regime. This implies that
Pt;unconstrained   Pt;constrained > 0:
4.2 The Eect of Liquidity Crises on Variance of the Stock Returns
By the variance decomposition rule, we have:
13V ar[Pt] = E [V ar[PtjUt]] + V ar[E [PtjUt]]; (26)
where V ar[Pt] is variance of Pt.
The rst term on the right hand side of equation (26) is given by:
E [V ar[PtjUt]] (27)
= Pr(Ut = 0)V ar[Pt;unconstrainedjUt = 0] + Pr(Ut = 1)V ar[Pt;constrainedjUt = 1]:
Combining equations (11) and (21), we get:
E [V ar[PtjUt]] =
 
Pr(Ut = 0)B2





V ar[E [PtjUt]] = Pr(Ut = 1)(1   Pr(Ut = 1))(Pt;unconstrained   Pt;constrained)
2 ; (29)
where V ar["t] denotes the variance of the productivity shock.
The eect of ! on V ar[Pt] is, however, not easily tractable in the presence of productivity
shocks. To focus on the eect of liquidity shocks, it is useful to shut o the productivity shock(i.e.,
V ar["t] = 0). In this case,
V ar[Pt] = V ar[E [PtjUt]]
= Pr(Ut = 1)(1   Pr(Ut = 1))(Pt;unconstrained   Pt;constrained)
2 : (30)
14The eect of ! on the variance is:
@V ar[Pt]
@!
= (1   2Pr(Ut = 1))(Pt;unconstrained   Pt;constrained)
2 @ Pr(Ut = 1)
@!
+Pr(Ut = 1)(1   Pr(Ut = 1))




From the preceding subsection, we recall that
@ Pr(Ut = 1)
@!
< 0: (32)
Also, as shown above, we have:








This result is stated as a proposition.
Proposition 2: If the creditor protection becomes stronger, the variance of stock returns
declines through two channels: (1) The dierence between the stock prices in the constrained
regime and the unconstrained regime decreases with better protection of creditors; and (2) The
probability of credit crunches declines with stronger protection.
We turn now to confront the main predictions of the model, in Propositions 1 and 2, with cross{
country data. Specically, we look for the presence of the mechanism we uncovered theoretically
in the data.
9If V ar ["t] is not equal to 0, then we can see that as ! rises, C1 will increase, and hence the volatility of Pt will
also increase in reaction to a shock to the technology, at. That is, when the constraint always binds, weak creditor
protection will reduce the stock price volatility. The intuition is that a binding credit constraint would reduce the
upside potential of good productivity shocks by constraining the rm growth.
155 Empirical support
Our model explains the empirical regularity presented in Section 2, higher stock market volatility
in countries with lower level of creditor protection. Our explanation relies on a specic mechanism
which we will now confront with the data. In particular, the model predicts that the volatility is
generated by the crises and that creditor rights protection lowers volatility by lowering the frequency
of the crises and by lowering the magnitude of stock market decline during crises.
First piece of evidence presented in Section 2, the fact that countries with higher level of creditor
protection experienced less of a decline in the stock market index during the current nancial crisis
is indeed consistent with the predictions of our model. We want to make sure, however, that there
is also historical evidence to support mechanisms described in our model. In particular, our model
predicts that (1) the incidence of nancial crises should be lower in countries with better creditor
protection and that (2) the decline in the stock market index during crises should be lower in
countries with better creditor protection.
We dene a liquidity crisis as a union of two sets of events: a sharp decline in bank credit to the
private sector and a sharp increase in the real interest rate. In both cases we dene observations
in the top 10 percent tail of annual changes in the underlying variable as crises, listed in Table 1.
These corresponds to the annual decline of credit to the private sector by 10 percent and to an
increase in real interest rate of over 4.3 percentage points in one year.10 Thus, our liquidity crisis
variable measures domestic liquidity crises and proxies for periods when credit constraints are likely
to be binding.11 Crisis episodes that we dene in this way are listed in Appendix Table 2.
The top panel of Table 3 shows the relationship between the frequency of liquidity crises, as
dened above, and the level of creditor rights protection. We nd that on average countries with
10We obtain the data on interest rates from IMF International Financial Statistics. We use line 22d for the bank
credit to private sector and divide it by the CPI index. For the interest rate, in most cases we use the money market
rate. When the money market rate is not available, we use the discount rate. We calculate the real interest rate by
subtracting the CPI ination rate from the nominal interest rate. We then calculate annual percentage changes in
these variables to identify liquidity crisis episodes.
11Note that because we are interested not only in the on{set of the crisis, but in the crisis situation, we keep our
indicator to be equal to 1 in all the years that our procedure determines as crises, and not only in the rst crisis year.
16Table 3: Frequency of liquidity crises, stock return, and creditor protection
Full sample Non-OECD OECD
Incidence of liquidity crises
Mean Low CRI 0.22 0.30 0.15
(N.obs) (779) (362) (417)
Mean High CRI 0.16 0.16 0.16
(N.obs) (445) (226) (219)
Dierence -0.062*** -0.15*** 0.008
(P-value) (0.006) (0.00) (0.77)
Dierence in median returns (crisis | non-crisis)
Mean Low CRI -0.55 -0.88 -0.31
(N.obs) (29) (12) (17)
Mean High CRI -0.18 -0.088 -0.27
(N.obs) (20) (10) (10)
Dierence 0.37* 0.79* 0.039
(P-value) (0.077) (0.088) (0.81)
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***signicant at 1%
17lower level of creditor rights protection tend to have more frequent crises, consistent with rst of
the two main model predictions. These dierences are driven by the sample of non-OECD countries
| for them frequency of crises is twice as high if they have low creditor rights protection. If a
non-OECD country has a good creditor rights protection, we nd that it has the same frequency
of liquidity crises as an average OECD country.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the relationship between the creditor rights index and the
decline in stock market return during crisis years compared to the stock market return in non{crisis
years. This \excess return" during crisis years is dened as a dierence between median returns
in crisis and non{crisis years for each country. To measure stock returns, we use monthly data
calculated by central banks, national statistical agencies, or stock exchanges themselves as of the
end{of{month closes. We scale down all stock market indexes by the local CPI at the end of the
month. To measure stock market level (q), we average the scaled down index for each country for
each calendar year.
We can see that the decline in stock market return is larger during crisis for countries with
lower creditor rights protection, which is exactly what our model predicts. The dierences are
statistically signicant, except for the OECD sample. Thus we nd that the data are consistent
with the second mechanism predicted by our model.
To push further our empirical tests of the mechanism presented in our model, we estimate a
probit regression of our liquidity crisis indicator on the indicator of high index of creditor rights
protection and it's interaction with the OECD dummy, and control variables, which include lagged
dependent variable, ICRG political stability index, growth rate of GDP per capita, a de jure measure
of capital controls. The results are reported in the rst column of the top panel of Table 4. We
conrm that liquidity crises are less frequent in countries with higher level of creditor protection,
but only in the sample of non-OECD countries. In terms of magnitude of the eects, an increase in
the creditor rights index from a low level of 0, 1, or 2 to a high level of 3 or 4 lowers the probability
of a liquidity crisis in a non-OECD country by 10 percentage points.
18Table 4: Propensity score matching and average treatment eects
Full sample High CRI Low CRI





OECD -0.038 0.021 0.0041
(0.042) (0.063) (0.049)
Lag(crisis) 0.15*** 0.12* 0.15***
(0.038) (0.062) (0.049)
Political stability -0.0021 -0.00045 -0.0035*
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0019)
Real GDP growth -0.0073 0.0086 -0.027**
(0.0086) (0.011) (0.013)
Capital controls -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0017*
(0.00077) (0.0012) (0.001)
Observations 869 326 543
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.028 0.088
Mean real annual stock return
Unmatched
Crisis 0.39 0.35 0.42
No crisis 0.66 0.33 0.87
Dierence -0.27 0.023 -0.46
P-value 0.34 0.96 0.18
Matched (ATT)
Crisis 0.41 0.35 0.42
No crisis 0.86 0.39 1.17
Dierence -0.46 -0.038 -0.75*
P-value 0.20 0.94 0.10
SD of real monthly stock return
Unmatched
Crisis 10.5 9.32 11.0
No crisis 7.56 7.27 7.74
Dierence 2.91*** 2.05*** 3.26***
P-value 0.00 0.002 0.00
Matched (ATT)
Crisis 10.5 9.32 11.0
No crisis 8.95 7.40 9.89
Dierence 1.54** 1.92** 1.10
P-value 0.013 0.029 0.17
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***signicant at 1%
19The second and third columns of the top panel reports the results of the regression analysis
conducted separately for the high creditor protection countries and low creditor protection countries
. Consistent with our intuition we nd that crises are persistent and that better political stability,
higher GDP growth, and capital controls all lower the probability of a liquidity crisis. Once these
controls are in place, we don't nd a dierence in this conditional crisis probability between OECD
and non-OECD countries.
Because creditor rights protection aects the probability of the crisis, and yet we want to
compare the stock market return and volatility during the crises, we undertake a propensity score
matching exercise. Using the estimates of the probit regressions described above, we construct the
propensity score and match crisis observations (treatment group) to non-crisis observations (control
group) using epanechnikov kernel matching. We limit the matched observations to common support.
We then compute average treatment eect on treated (ATT), using the matched sample, for stock
market return and volatility.
The results of the matching exercise are reported in the two bottom panels of Table 4. First
columns reports benchmark results for the full sample of countries. We nd that, in matched sample,
stock market return is only half as high during the crisis, although the dierence between crisis
and non-crisis stock return is not statistically signicant. We also nd that in a matched sample
the stock return volatility is substantially higher during crisis, and the dierences are statistically
signicant.
Our main goal, however, is to test whether these dierences between crisis and non-crisis stock
returns are higher for countries with low level of creditor rights protection. To this end, we repeat
the matching exercise for the subsamples of countries with high and low levels of creditor rights
indicator. We nd that for countries with good creditor rights protection there is absolutely no
dierence in matched or unmatched sample, between stock returns during crisis episodes and during
normal times. For countries with low creditor rights indicator, however, we nd, for the matches
sample, that stock market returns are three times lower during the crises, and the dierence between
20stock returns in crises and normal times are statistically signicant. This test, therefore, provides
strong support for the mechanism highlighted in our model.
Even though our model does not have direct predictions on the relative volatility of stock returns
in crisis and in normal times, we nd that for both samples of countries stock market volatility is
higher during crises. This nding is consistent with our intuition and with the spirit of our model.
Overall then, we denitely cannot reject the possibility that the relationship between historic
stock market volatility or decline in stock market indexes during current crises and the level of
creditor rights protection works in the way described by our model. Moreover, of the two main
testable implications of the model, we nd strong support for both higher frequency of crises and
larger change in stock market returns during crises in countries with poor creditor rights protection.
Thus, we are condent that our theory has empirical relevance.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the connection between creditor protection, response to stock prices to
liquidity crises, and the volatility of stock returns. Tobin q model of stock prices predicts that the
strengthening of the creditor protection results in higher expected returns and reduced volatility.
We nd strong empirical support for both the prediction of the model and the mechanism through
which creditor protection aects stock market returns.
Our paper thus demonstrates the importance of creditor protection for the development of a
well{functioning stock market: strong creditor rights not only enhances stock market values, it also
reduces the volatility of the stock returns.
Finally, there are other mechanisms through which creditor protection may aect the level and
volatility of stock market prices. For instance, Hale, Razin, and Tong (2006) analyze the moral
hazard channel.
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247 Appendix I. Derivation of Stock Price Under Friction-Free Regime








Linearizing ln(1 +  (Qt   1)) at the steady state  Q = 1 yields:
kt+1 = kt + v (Qt   1): (A2)
Linearizing Rt+1 at the steady state,  A and  K, gives:
Rt+1 = (1   )  K
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(1   )  K
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Around the steady state, (Qt+1   1)
2 is an order of magnitude smaller than the term (Qt+1   1).
Accordingly, we drop (Qt+1   1)
2 from the approximation equation (A5) , and get:
(1 + r)Qt = (1   )  K
 
1 + at+1   kt+1 + ln  K

+ Et [Qt+1]: (A6)
25Note that
at+1 = at + "t+1: (A7)




1 + ln  K + at + (v   kt)
  K + Et [Qt+1]
 
1 + r + v(1   )  K
 (A8)
26Appendix 2. Additional tables
Table A1. Creditor rights index as of 2007
Low creditor rights index High creditor rights index















Philippines Creditor rights index = 4
Hungary United Kingdom




















27Table A2. List of liquidity crises in the sample
Country Years of nancial crisis
Non-OECD countries:
Argentina 1982-85, 1990-1991, 1994, 2001-2004
Brazil 1982, 1985-1987, 1989-1990, 1994-1995, 1997-1998
Bulgaria 1992-1995, 1997, 2005
Chile 1981, 1983-1986, 1988, 1991, 1996, 1998, 2005
China 1988, 1994, 1997, 2007
Colombia 1988, 1991, 1994, 1999-2000
Cyprus 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998
Hong Kong 1991, 1999
Hungary 1984, 1988, 1991-1993, 1995
India 1989, 1991, 1995
Indonesia 1998-1999
Israel 1981, 1985-1986, 1995, 1999, 2006
Korea 1983, 1992
Malaysia 1987, 1990, 2000
Mexico 1982-1983, 1988
Pakistan 1984, 1999-2000
Peru 1984-1987, 1989, 1991, 2000-2001, 2003-2004, 2006
Philippines 1984-1986, 1990, 1998-2001, 2005, 2007
Poland 1982-1984, 1987-1990, 1992, 1994-1995, 1997
Romania 1991, 1997, 1999-2000
Singapore 1990, 1995, 2002, 2004, 2007
Slovenia 1992, 2007
South Africa 1983, 1992, 2002
Sri Lanka 1982, 1984-1985, 1989, 1991, 1994, 2002
Thailand 1982, 1984, 1999-2001
Venezuela 1984, 1986, 1989-1990, 1993-1994, 2002-2003
OECD countries:
Australia 1981, 1984, 1997, 2001, 2003
Austria 1986
Belgium 1986
Canada 1992, 1994, 2007
Czech Republic 1998-2002, 2007
Denmark 1982, 1990-1991, 1993-1994, 2006




Italy 1986, 1991-1992, 1996, 2005-2006
Japan 1982, 1985, 1991, 1999, 2001
Luxembourg 1983, 1985, 1995, 2002
Mexico 1995-1996, 1998-2001, 2003
Netherlands 1981, 1983, 1986, 2006
New Zealand 1982, 1984, 1988, 1999
Norway 1991, 1998
Portugal 1985-1987, 1991
Spain 1984, 1987, 2002
Sweden 1984, 1991-1995, 2000, 2004
Switzerland 1986, 1994
Turkey 1986, 1988-1989, 1994, 1997-1998, 2001
UK 1982, 2001
US 1993-1994, 2006
28